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THE WELFARE EFFORT OF THE bRUITED STATES: KNOU THEN THYSELF
Leonard S. Miller, Associate Professor
Marleen Clark, MSW
School of Social Welfare, University of California, Berkeley
The Argument and the Findings
It seems obvious that the United States is not meeting the welfare needs of
all its citizens in a adequate and equitable manner. But, it is neither clear
what rearrangement of national priorities would result in more resources for wel-
fare state usage, nor, given the resources at its disposal, is it clear what
priorities and activities within the welfare state would lead to best reeting the
needs of its users. Countrymen, what is to be done?
There are two basic strategies that can be followed. One focuses on securing
larger budgets for the welfare state, the other focuses on -al-in mfore efficient
usage of existing budgets. The purpose of this article is to core to sore ludge-
ment, albeit tentative, about the probable success of pursuing thie first strategy,
and to suggest areas of priority relevant to the second strategy. To facilitate
the raking of these judgements we make three calculations wkiich corprise the body
of this paper and they have some intrinsic interest of their own.
Let us begin with the strategy cf increased budgets. Twc questions relevant to
this strategy are immediate: what is the likelihood of anticipating a ralor welfare
state budget change in the near future, ; and what is the likelihood that the mili-
tary budget would offer a source of funds for such an increase?
Wilensky has argued that welfare states in advanced nations structurally
resemble one another, and that this pattern of similarity increases with the devel-
opment process.1 Following Wilensky's work one of the authors of this paper showed
that the magnitude of national welfare efforts in 64 jations throughout the world
are similarly determined by supply and demand forces. There appears to be a struc-
tural pattern, an international "social normalcy," or expectation about what consti-
tutes the appropriate size of any national welfare state, given a basic national
description. If, as Wilensky argues, patterns are converging, then one should anti-
cipate that national welfare state budgets smaller (larger) than expected would be
more (less) likely to increase over time than to decrease (increase) over time.
Our first calculation determines whether the size of the United States welfare
effort is more or less than expected when the size of her per capita income, the
size of her military effort, the proportion of her aged, and her political system
are considered simultaneously. Contrary to the rather commonly held opinion we
find that the United States is not a welfare state laggard, but for 1966 at least,
she spent more than would be predicted, given her description. From the argument
above it follows that the U.S. is less likely to increase her welfare state size
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than if she actually were a laggard.
The second question relevant to the increased resources strategy is to deter-
mine where budget increases might come from and how large they might be. The
single largest competitor to the welfare state for resources is the defense budget.
Consequently, it may appear as a likely source for welfare state funding increases.
David Stockman's most interesting article in the Public Interest argues persuasive-
ly, in our opinion, that very little can be expected from this source. We quote:
The basic problem is that strategic weapons and other military hardware
have always constituted the primary targets for cuts, but the share of the
defense budget attributable to these items has dropped from nearly 50 per
cent in 1964 to less than 30 per cent during the current fiscal year (or
in 1975 dollar amounts, from $38 billion in the former year to $23 billion
today). This rather pervasive shift is largely the result of the escalating
costs of manpower under the volunteer army. Since the latter is probably
invulnerable at present, the effect has been to narrow the target for de-
fense budget reductions quite substantially.
3
In relentless pursuit of even the possibility of a diminished defense budget,
we ask how much of each reduced dollar of defense spending should one expect soci-
ety to transfer to welfare state purposes? To estimate an answer to this question
we first formulate and estimate a model that describes this historical welfare
effort of the United States. Based on this model we estimate tile welfare-warfare
trade-off, the increase in the welfare state budget that is expected from saving a
dollar of defense expenditures. We find that six cents is the expected welfare
state budget allocation for every dollar saved from the military budget.
The combination of a welfare state level that is above "normal" in size, and
consequently less likely to increase than to decrease, the likelihood that defense
is not subject to severe cuts at this time, and the rather small increases in wel-
fare budgets that would follow a successful effort to demilitarize, suggest that a
strategy to increase the welfare budget, at least through marauding the defense
budget, is likely to be bankrupt. Consequently, our focus shifts and attention is
directed to the welfare state itself.
Using the historical model of the United States welfare effort, developed to
estimate the welfare-warfare tradeoff, which is naturally limited in its considera-
tions of possible welfare state programs, we estimate where future welfare state
problems probably lie and indicate how present research and planning might best
prepare for expected future increases. Our results suggest that problems associated
with aging populations are the number one future priority. This result is in agree-
ment with the recent call for the development of the technology of care, or main-
tenance programs, within welfare. 4 The discussion that follows indicates in greater
detail the analysis and methodology behind the calculations that led us to the above
judgements.
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Are U.S. Welfare State Expenditures Greater Than or Less Than Expected?
The United States has been characterized as a welfare state "laggard," a
description that is beset with negative performance characteristics: the failure
to spend some expected proportion of GNP; a level of spending that is low in compar-
ison to other rich nations; a nation slow to start social programs, such as work-
men's compensation and national health insurance, and one that is grudging in its
support of programs once they have begun. 5 , 6 In short, the laggard view placed the
United States in the company of the reluctant public welfare providers, such as
Australia, Canada, Japan and Switzerland, in contrast to the welfare state leaders,
West Germany, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and France. How does this view
hold up under analysis?
A decade ago the United States' welfare effort (government expenditures on wel-
fare and health as a proportion of GNP) was 7.9%. How close is this value to the
value that would be predicted for any country with similar per capita C1P, military
effort (government expenditures on military as a proportion of GNP), political
system, and proportion aged in the population? A recent international study of the
structural determinants of the welfare effort by one of the authors estimated a
relationship between these descriptive variables and the welfare efforts of 64
nations (23 of which were advanced nations). 7 That model predicts a 1966 U.S. wel-
fare effort of 7.4%, a half of a percentage point less than the actual U.S. perfor-
mance.
As the United States has the highest GNP per capita it might be suspect of
being an outlier, a nation not appropriately represented by the estimated interna-
tional model. While there may be some truth in this point, one's reservations might
be tempered with the knowledge that of the four explanatory variables in the model
only in GNP per capita was the U.S.'s variable values at an extreme. Moreover, the
implications that follow from excluding the U.S. from the international model's
estimation lead to a comparative portrait of the U.S. showing her even more rela-
tively advanced than that described above. Because (1) the U.S. welfare expendi-
tures were less than those predicted by the model, and (2) the method of least
squares was used to estimate the model's coefficients, excluding the U.S. from the
estimation sample only results in an international model that predicts less of a
U.S. effort than the model that includes her in its estimation. In point of fact,
a model estimated without the U.S. predicts a U.S. effort of only 6.9%, a full per-
centage point less than her actual performance. Tests showed no significant diffe-
rences between the estimates of the two models. Because we will be using two of
these international coefficient estimates in the section to follow we present them
In Table I.
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TABLE I: Estimates of the
Structural Determinants of the Welfare Effort
Coefficient Coefficient
Estimates Estimates
Variablesa  Units U.S. Included U.S. Excluded
Constant 8.834.lOE-lt 8.998.lOE-lt
HG $ -2.598.lOE-3+ -2. 793.lOE-3*
HM % GNP 1.696+ 1.681+
HM2  % GNP -l.606.fOE-l+ -1. 612.lOE-l+
LG $ 5.304.1OE-3+ 5.248.10E-3+
HA Proportion i.211.lOE2+ 1.245.10E2+
of
population
PI Nominal 4. 721+ 4.755+
P2 Nominal 2.239* 2.259*
P3 Nominal 6.190.10E-1 6.188.lOE-l+
a) H and L denote high and low income countries: G - GNP per capita,
M - military effort, A = proporation of population aged 65 and over;
PI, P2, and P3 are the political system indicators - totalitarian,
liberal democratic and authoritarian oligarchic states, respectively.
See Wilensky (1975), p. 138 for the classification by nation. The
United States is a liberal democratic state.
* = significant at - - .05
+ = significant at a - .01
t - No standard errors are provided by the algorithm.
Our positive difference between actual and estimated expenditure level contra-
dicts Aaron's finding that estimated U.S. welfare expenditures (again, as a percen-
tage of GNP) exceeded actual expenditures. 8 The goal of his study was also to
discover if there were common determinants of social security expenditures. He
had a sample of twenty-two countries and found the most important determinants to
be per capita income, age of the social security system, and household saving.
His model predicted a U.S. welfare effort for 1956-57 at 6.2%, while the actual
U.S. effort was 4.9% (these figures are based on data somewhat different from ours,
and accordingly only the difference between us is important to this argument).
There seems to be a clear difference between these two results. We are somewhat
comforted by the fact that while Aaron found age of the system to be one of his
three most important explainants it only accounted for an additional one-half of
one percent of the variance in welfare effort in the international model discussed
above after GN2P per capita, proporation aged, military effort, and political system
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had been included. While there is need for further clarification on the comparison
between predicted and actual welfare state expenditures, we must tentatively reject
the supposition that the Lited States is somehow performing below expectations.
The Potential Welfare-Warfare Tradeoff
If expenditures on welfare and expenditures on warfare were the only social
choices, then every dollar withheld from military expenditures would be available
for welfare expenditures. This is obviously not the case, as the competition for
government monies extends into every sector of social concern. Including, as one
should, the possibility of not collecting taxes, the competition extends into every
private concern as well. This recognition prompts us to ask how much of each dollar
withheld from military expenditures can one expect to be allocated to welfare ex-
penditures? We call this reallocation the potential welfare-warfare tradeoff.
Estimating the magnitude of this tradeoff is quite straightforward. First,
one needs an explanation for the size of the welfare effort as a function of the
size of the military effort. For illustrative purposes we can use either of the
international models presented in Table I. We say illustrative because a cross-
sectional international model is only suggestive of average changes which may
occur in some artifact average nation. It is not an appropriate description for any
particular country.
Second, using this explanation, one can calculate the rate of change in the
welfare effort due to a unit reduction in the military effort. The derivative of
the welfare effort supply with respect to the military effort, according to Table I
(U.S. included model) and evaluated at the U.S. military effort for 1966 (9.1 per
cent), yields the result that a unit decline in military effort, which in this case
is 1 percentage point, produces a 1.23 unit increase in welfare effort, which in
this case is 1.23 percentage points. If the dollar increase in welfare spending
arising from the dollar decline in military spending is divided by the dollar de-
cline in military spending we have the welfare-warfare tradeoff-the welfare increase
for each dollar reduction of military expenditures. Thus the third step is to
determine the dollars associated with the 1 percentage point decline in military
effort and the dollars associated with the 1.23 perCentage points rise in welfare
effort and then to divide the former into the latter.
Let $H measure the dollar reduction in military expenditures and SW measure
the military-induced increase in welfare expenditures. Given our data, SM is the
product of (1) the military effort, which is the ratio of military expenditures to
the GNP, (2) the GNP per capita, and (3) the population size. Similarly, SW is the
product of 1.23 times (1) the welfare effort, which is the ratio of welfare expendi-
tures to the GUP, (2) the GNP per capita, and (3) the population size. Dividing
the former expression into the latter expression yields:
(1) Welfare-W$arfare tradeoff - $ (l.23)(Welfare effort) (GUlP/capita) (capita)
I e(Military effort)(GP/capita)(capita)
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The latter two terms of this expression cancel. According to Wilensky's data the
tradeoff is simrplv: (1.23)(7.9%)
Welfare-Warfare tradeoff- = (9.1%) = 1.07.
A welfare-warfare tradeoff of approximately I means that if the international
rcdcl were tile aprrcrriate model, and if one were only interested in welfare expen-
ditures, demilitarization would be a fruitful goal--every dollar saved from mili-
tary expenditures would result in the increase of a dollar in welfare expenditures.
This result implies that no other private or social interests would capture any of
these savings.
For our purpose, a more accurate calculation of this tradeoff would result
from an analysis of the welfare effort of the United States itself. To fulfill
the task of calculating a reasonable estimate of the welfare-warfare tradeoff for
the U.S. we must first estimate an historic model of the U.S. welfare experience,
and then apply the methodology just illustrated. The data used tc estimate the
model are U.S. observations for the years from 1935-1973. The structure of this
model, built on supply and demand forces, will parallel that developed for the
international model. Let us turn to supply considerations first.
The Variables of the U.S. Historical Model
filitary effort, similar to the international model, is measured as the pro-
portion of GNP spent for national defense. Results from the international model
suggest that military efforts of more than 5.5 percent of GNP substitute for wel-
fare efforts. Except for the five years we considered that preceded World liar II,
annual military efforts have exceeded 5.5 percent, with few exceptions. Thus, a
negative, or substitute, relationship between military expenditures and welfare
expenditures is expected.
This expectation conforms with previous research on the question. Russett
found significant decreases in health, education, and welfare spending when defense
spending increased, with the greatest decrease in welfare programs.
9
It would seem sufficient to specify the military effort measure in an equation
for welfare effort and anticipate a negative sign on its coefficient. However, to
test for the possibility of a somewhat more complicated curvature in the relation-
ship between welfare effort and military effort we began by including both the
military effort value and the square of the military effort variable in the wel-
fare effort specification.
In the international model we found that increases in per capita GNP in the
rich nations led to diminishing percentage GNP expenditures on welfare. There, per
capita GNP was considered as a supply variable, which was probably a specification
error. Per capita GP actually measures both the availability of resources, which
is supply related, and the national income, which is demand related. As a supply
measure the availability of resources should be positively related to welfare. The
more resources that are available, the more that can go to welfare. As a demand
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reasure the opposite prediction is expected. Positive increments in national income,
over the historic period in question, are usually interpreted to mean that people
are better off. Consequently, their welfare needs are lower and they demand less
welfare. These arguments imply that the effect of an increase in per capita (24P
on welfare effort is ambiguous. If the supply forces exceed the demand forces,
the sign of the coefficient on per capita QJP should be positive. If the demand
forces exceed the supply forces the sign of the coefficient on per capita GJ.P
should be negative. And if there is a balance between these two forces the esti-
mate of the coefficient on per capita (MP should not differ (statistically) from
zero. We turn now to considerations about less ambiguous demand variables.
While populations at risk are more or less able to voice their needs, society
has collectively determined that certain groups have needs which require public
responses, and has fashioned a welfare system to respond to these needs. The najor
groups so recognized are the aged, children in need, and workcrs whose connections
with the market has teen tempcrarily or permanently disrupted. Lircct and indirect
measures of these populations should provide reasonable denand variables.
The proportion of the porulation aged 65 and older is an obvicus choice-it
was the most important variable in the international model. There is no reason
to believe that this variable would be any less important in the Urited States. Ihe
expect a positive relation between the proportion aged and the welfare effort.
There appears to be an increasing propensity for women in disrupted families
to form separate households tian in the past.10 It seems Tlausible to believe that
female-headed families, particularly those with children, are a higher-risk group
(in terms of needing aid from the public sector) than families in general. The
proportion of primary families which are female-headed becomes the second demand
variable. As the proportion cf female-headed families rises, w'e expect the welfare
effort to rise as well.
Unfortunately, accurate and comparable data on both female-headed and primary
families were not available prier to 1950. Consequently, an indicator variable,
which we denote DF, was also included in the specification for welfare demand.
Between 1935 and 1949 the indicator variable takes on the value 1 and the proportion
female-headed of primary families takes on the value zero. Eetween 1950 and 1973
the indicator variable takes on the value 0, and the proportion female-headed of
primary families takes on its estimated value.
The annual unemployment rate, an average of tLe monthly rates, also measures
welfare effort demand. The reasons seem obvious. UnemFployment benefits and welfare
payments to those whose benefits have been exhausted or to those wthc were not ccv-
ered in the first place are part of welfare effort. In addition, in tires of high
unemployment some people, ineligible for Social Security benefits solely because of
earned income, are made eligible by unemployment and collect those Lenefits.
While there may be some methodological argument about the accuracy of govern-
ment data with regard to unemployment (especially for the earlier period of our
-388-
analysis), we consider the annual rate an adequate approximation of the condition
of the labor market in any one year. As unemployment rises we expect welfare effort
to rise as well.
There is no doubt that other variables could be considered here as well, but
we believe these three to be sufficient to test our specification. We did not use
data strictly comparable to that used in the international model, due to different
sources. Details may be found in the Appendix. One final point: we chose to lag
the annual demand variables by one year as we expected that their full impact would
not be felt until that time.
In summary, and to clarify notation that is to follow, the following variables
are included in the model:
W
S  
welfare effort supplied, the proportion of GNP allocated to public
D expenditures on health and welfare
W
D  
welfare effort demanded, which is not measured
GNP gross national product per capita, converted to 1966 prices
MIL military effort, the proportion of GNP spent on national defense
MIL
2 
military effort, squared
AGED the proportion of the population which is aged sixty-five and older
UN the average of monthly unemployment rates
FHF the proportion of primary families which are female-headed
DF an indicator variable taking on the value of I or 0 as the year is
before 1950 or is 1950-73, respectively
C a random variable.
Model Specification
Equations (2) and (3) denote the supply and demand equations, respectively.
(2) w =a + a1GNP + 2MIL + 1.IL + a WD + E
t 0 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t St
(3) Wt = Yo + yIGNPt + Y2 AGEDt-I + Y3 Tt-1 + y4FIFt-1 + Y5DFt-1 + EDt
Substituting equation (3) into (2) yields the model to be estimated:
(4) W S (0 + a4YO ) + (81 + 84Y1 )GNPt + a2 MILt + 83MIL2 + 84 Y2AGEDt-1
+ 84Y 3UNt_ 1 + O4Y 4FHFt_ 1 + 84Y5DFtI +
where Tt. CSt +  4CDt
Table II presents, in summary form, the hypotheses associated with the esti-
mates of the coefficients. Descriptive statistics of the variables are displayed
in Table III.
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TABLE II
Hypotheses on the Estimate of
Coefficient
0 + 84 Y0 =
1 + 4yI = 62
82 = 2
83 = 63
=64
£4Y2 - 4
6 4 y 3 = 65
E4Y4 66
4Y5 = 67
the Specified Model
Null Alternate
do-0 do0
From the discussion of the
hypotheses about GNP we would
expect i > 0, ( 4 > U, and
V < U. Therefore,
d1 = 0 d # 0
d2 = ( d2 > 0 if d
d = 0
d4= 0
d = 0
d50
d-6  0
d7= 0
3<0
< 0 if d 3 = 0
d3 <0
d4 >0
d5 >0
d 6 > 0
d 7 >0
d7> 0
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Variable
Constant
aL
Nt
2MILt
AGEDt_ 1
U t-
FHF t_ 1
DFt- 1
Descriptive Statistics
TABLE III
of the Historic Model's Variables
Variable Units
WS Proportion
of GNP
GNP $1000
MIL Proportion
of GNP
AGED Proportion
of the
Population
UN Percent of
Labor Force
FHF Proportion
of Primary
Families
n Maximum Minimum Mean
Standard
Deviation
38 0.115 0.019 0.063 0.022
38 4.474 1.508 2.904 0.799
38 0.383 0.010 0.101 0.087
38 0.100 0.061 0.084 0.012
38 20.100 1.200 6.510 4.930
23 0.115 0.093 0.101 0.006
Estimation of the Historic Model
Our first estimate (Model 1, Table IV) indicates that the forces of increased
resource availability and decreased demand are in balance. The coefficient on
the percapita GNP term estimates not statistically different from zero. The model
1 estimates also show that the more complex curvature between military effort and
welfare effort is unnecessary. The coefficient on the square of the military effort
term is also not statistically different from zero. All other estimates are statis-
tically different from zero in the predicted directions.
Unfortunately, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there it a problem
of autocorrelation, a not uncommon occurrence in time-series analysis. Conse-
quently, we have reason to doubt whether these estimates are best linear unbiased.
The Durbin-Watson d statistic has a distribution that depends on sample size and
the number of variables in the specification. For example, the area of uncertainty
for 38 observations and 5 variables lies between 1.12 and 1.70. A d less than the
lower limit of 1.12 indicates autocorrelation; a value above the upper limit of 1.70
indicates the absence of autocorrelation at the 5 percent level of significance. A
value lying in the area between the limits is considered inconclusive. Since the d
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Descrit)tive Statistics
value for model 1 is 1.17, the odds heavily favor the presence of autocorrelation.
The standard method to rectify this problem is to substitute the procedures
of generalized least squares for those of ordinary least squares.12 While the
methodology to do this is straight forward, its employment requires one to know
(in this case) the intertemporal relationships between the error terms of equation
(4). After considerable experimentation the test meaningful intertemporal rela-
tionship we could find was a simple correlation between an error and its 4 year
lagged error. Such an error structure suggests a life cycle in the office of the
presidency. Relative advances and declines in annual welfare efforts are made
during particular phases of the four year cycle. After transforming Model l's
variables to neutralize its autocorrelation, model 1 was re-estimated. These re-
sults appear in Table IV as Model 2. Having verified that the per capita CIP and
MIL 2 coefficients were indeed not statistically different from zero. we eliminated
them from the specification. We then estimated the simplified specification with
ordinary least squares, which is presented as Model 3, used these estimates to
construct the generalized least squares variable transformations, then re-estimated
Model 3 to obtain our final results, which appear in Table IV as Model 4.
Note that the generalized least squares procedure increased the Durbin-Watson
d from a value of 1.06 for the variables in the Model 3 to a value of 1.55 for
Model 4. While the value of 1.55 does not suggest the absence of autocorrelation
(at the .05 level of significance), it shows considerable improvement over the
ordinary least squares estimates.
Estimating the Welfare-Warfare Tradeoff
As we expected, military spending erodes welfare spending, but not to the
extent that the international model suggested that it would. A one percentage
point increase (decrease) in military spending is associated with 9/100th of a
percentage point decrease (increase) in welfare spending. Substituting the U.S.
average military effort, 10.1 percent, and the U.S. average welfare effort, 6.3
percent, and the rate of increase in welfare effort for a decrease in military
effort of 1 percentage point, .09, into equation (1), yields a U.S. historic
welfare-warfare tradeoff of only .056. Unless there is some major qualitative
change in the historic determinants of welfare, one should expect 6 cents, on the
average, to be shifted over to welfare for every dollar saved from military expen-
ditures.
Interpreting the Demand Variables of Model 4
As in the international model the proportion of persons age sixty-five and
older proves to be a significant determinant of the welfare effort. An increase of
1 percentage point in the proportion aged leads to an increase of 1.3 percentage
points in the welfare effort. Changes in the proportion aged affect welfare simi-
lary in both the international model and the U.S. historic model.
- IQ , _
Estimates of the
Variable
Constant
MIL
AIL2
AGED
TABLE IV
Historic Determinants
Model 1 Model 2
-.29627+ -.25382+
(.05894) (.05048)
-.00788 -. 00064
(.00742) (.00630)
-.15901* -.14753+
(.06562) (.05357)
.21395 .14314
(.15254) (.12183)
1.48851+ 1.29001+
(.52085) (.43886)
.00104* .00073
(.00049) (.00041)
2.3009+ 2.15382+
(.58864) (.53099)
.25867+ .21618+
(.05512) (.04954)
of United States Welfare Effort
Model 3 Model 4
-.25670+ -.25985+
(.02402) (.01640)
-.08700+ -.08992+
(.01757) (.01646)
1.12929+
(.39345)
.00128*
(.00048)
2.24383
(.39121)
.22354+
(.03462)
1.29851+
(.32502)
.00085*
(.00038)
2.13916+
(.31501)
.21661+
(.02737)
Durbin-Watson
d Statistic
R
2
1.169
.944
1.479
.965
1.062
.939
1.551
.966
(Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates)
* Significant at a = .05
+ Significant at a - .01
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Changes in unemployment rates are approximately as significant in their effect
as are changes in the military effort. An increase in unemployment by 1 percentage
point increases the welfare effort again by 9/100ths of a percentage point. The
model we are estimating is extremely simple and does not really allow us to study
the full nexus of interrelationships between the explainants of welfare effort.
However, as our society is presently constructed, unemployment is probably negatively
related to military spending; demilitarization probably increases unemployment. Con-
sequently, welfare should doubly rise from demilitarization--first because of the
direct effect of demilitarization, and second, because of the indirect effect of
unemployment. While no one wants to increase uelfare expenditures through actions
that lead to unemployment, demilitarization, in this piecemeal world we live in,
probably would cause this result.
The proportion of primary families which are female-headed proves to be the
determinant of greatest magnitude in the historic model. A 1 percentage point
increase in the proportion female-headed primary families leads to a 2.1 percentage
points increase in the welfare effort. While contemplating the better types of
social restructuring to come, let us hopefully look forward to a diminishing impor-
tance to this estimate. Over the past two decades this variable has been strongly
associated with increases in welfare effort. But, if economic discrimination
against women diminishes, and if the birth rate remains low, the proportion female-
headed families could continue to rise without evoking such an increased demand on
the welfare system.
Discovering Welfare Priorities
Though we have been somewhat speculative in interpreting our results, provided
there are no major changes in social functioning, the overall conclusion must be
that little is likely to be gained for welfare by pointing a finger at the military.
Let us be more self-reflective.
Our third calculation probes the future with the purpose of determining pri-
orities within the welfare industry itself. First we make predictions of the wel-
fare effort, for five year intervals, to the year 2001, ignoring the possibility of
major social change, complete economic depression, and total nuclear war. Then we
compare the size of each variable's increment to the welfare effort and order these
increments as to their implied priorities.
Predictions
To predict welfare effort we need projections for the independent variables
in the model. In the case of the proportion aged and proportion of female-headed
fmilies, we were able to use Census Bureau projections. For female-headed families
projections, the Bureau has provided high and low estimates. But for the remainder
of the determinants, we were limited only by reason and imagination.
Military effort projections were problematic and highly speculative. Under
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what conditions will military expenses as a proportion of MNP increase, remain
the same, or decrease? If the military establihment continues to be a strong
demander of the national resources we might expect the level to remain at least
the same, or increase incrementally. If a "backlash" against military expendi-
tures is combined with increasing demand strength in other sectors, we might expect
military effort to remain the same or decrease to some level of minimum mainten-
ance. Russett 1 3 showed that the level of proportional military expenditures after
major wars has seldom fallen to its pre-war level, so that, omitting war years as
special cases, expenditures have tended to increase over the years, perhaps as a
result of incremental budgeting or increasing international tensions or both.
To explore the historical relationship between GNP and military effort we
regressed military effort on GNP for the period 1947-73 (to omit the extraordinary
expenses of the World War II years). The coefficient on GNP was not statistically
different from zero. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated severe positive corre-
lation between first difference errors, which was not significantly diminished
by regressions on first differences in the variable observations.
Mt (.0936 - .00284 t R2. .006: Durbin-Watson - .42: (standard
(0234) (.00709)eros errors)
Given these results we chose to specify military effort as a constant propor-
tion of GNP. The average U.S. military effort over the period 1947-1973 was 8.44
percent.
Unemployment has been portrayed at two constant rates; 8 percent, indicating
market failure, and 4 percent, indicating market success.
Table VI lists the independent determinants of welfare effort to the year 2001.
We have included four projections here, but the reader can predict any situ-
ation he or she might find plausible. Examination of Table VII, which presents the
projections, indicates that most of the differences in projections are caused by
the differences in the projected proportions of female-headed families. A compari-
son of estimate I with estimate 3, or of estimate 2 with estimate 4, shows that
the 4 percent unemployment differential accounts for only a miniscule increment in
welfare effort. The high unemployment and the high projected proportion of female-
headed families predictably produces the highest level of welfare effort. A high
unemployment scenario would probably be associated with a slow labor market advance
for women. This possibility lends credence to model 4's female-headed families
coefficient estimate and, by implication, to the projected welfare effort percen-
tages. A low unemployment scenario would probably be associated with more rapid
labor market advances for women, a diminishing female-headed families coefficient,
and projected welfare effort percentages that are smaller than those based on model
4's proportion female-headed families coefficient.
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TABLE VI
Projections of Determinants
Supply Variable
Military effort
projected at
Year constant rate
1976 .0844
1981 .0844
1986 .0844
1991 .0844
1996 .0844
2001 .0844
Demand Variables
Proportion of
Population
Year 65
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Unempolyment
Low High
z
.10461
.11008
.11389
.11806
.11909
.11657
Proportion female-
headed families
Low High
.10775
.10690
.10519
.10305
.10069*
.09824*
.10926
.10978
.10975
.10980
10977*
.10982*
*Projections based on previous
oly through 1990.
proportions. U.S. Census projections available
TABLE VII
Prediction af Future U.S. Welfare Efforts
Estimate 1 Estimate 2 Estimate 3
Unemployment-8%
Female-Headed
Year Families/High
1976 .1072
1981 .1154
1986 .1203
1991 .1258
1996 .1271
2001 .1239
Same as 1, but
Female-Headed
Families/Low
.1040
.1193
.1105
.1114
.1076
.0992
Unemployment-4%
Feale-Headed
Families/High
.1038
.1120
.1169
.1224
.1237
.1205
Same as 3, but
Female-Headed
Families /Low
.1006
.1059
.1072
.1180
.1043
.0958
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Estimate 4
While the projected level of welfare effort does not appear to vary much, the
range in predicted welfare effort is between -. 005 and +.017. Note that a change
from .10 to .11, when considered in absolute dollars, is not an inconsiderable
sum; given a present welfare expenditure of approximately $140 billion annually,
a .01 difference refers to an additional $1.4 billion to be allocated to welfare
needs.
Induced Increments to Welfare Effort
The U.S. historic model, as a predictive tool, can suggest the future influ-
ences its variables might have on the size of welfare efforts. It is easy and
obvious to say that the proportion of aged persons is growing, therefore we should
allocate more resources to this group. Without an empirical base, however, we
can only guess the relative importance of competing welfare effort demands. What
inferences can be drawn from the model to guide resource allocation within the
welfare industry?
An interesting example of relative priority determination arises out of the
comparison between the female-headed family induced effort and the proportion aged
induced effort. Taking the average 1976 female-headed family projection, .10850,
and subtracting this figure from the year 2000 projected female-headed family
proportions, for each series, results in a proportion female-headed family change
of either -. 01026 or +.00132. Multiplying these changes by the estimate of the
marginal change in welfare effort induced by a unit change in proportion female-
headed families predicts either a decrease of -. 02 or an increase of .002 in wel-
fare expenditures as a proportion of GNP. The same procedure applied to the pro-
jected increase of the proportion aged population over the next twenty-five years
results in a predicted increase in welfare effort of .013. Thus, by the year
2000, we estimate that the aged population will induce an additional 1.5 billion
dollars of expenditures over that induced by AFDC and related considerations.
Further extension into the future emphasizes the importance of the aging
population as a welfare concern. Census Bureau quinquennial projections through
the year 2050 reach a maximum proportion of persons aged 65 and older to total
population of .17 in the year 2030.14 According to our model an increase of .069
in welfare effort is predicted for the period from 2000 to 2030. This roughly
implies an additional 10 billion dollar growth in the welfare industry.
Our models are simple, all other variables are assumed to be held constant,
and our results must be considered crude. However, they have clear implications
for social work policy. Until better estimates become available it seems likely
that we should place added emphasis in the curriculum and in the field on those
programs and services directed toward the aging and in deveigping research in the
area of care or maintenance services for this target group.
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Conclusion
In the body of this paper we have offered answers to three questions. First,
is the United States truly a welfare state laggard? In terms of percentage of CIP
expended on public welfare programs and compared to other rich countries it seems
so. However, we found that the United States actually spent more on w:elfare state
programs than would be predicted for a country with its description, at least for
1966.
We went on to estimate the historic L.S. welfare-warfare tradeoff by speci-
fying and estimating time-series determinants of this effort. The chosen variables
seem to explain much of the variance in welfare effort produced in the United
States. The coefficient estimates indicate that if relatively small changes are
made in the determinants of social choice, six cents would go into welfare state
spending for every dollar saved from military spending. Finally, we used the
historic model to predict the expected welfare state effort over the next twenty-
five years. Our results suggest that among the areas considered, services for the
aging population have the highest future priority.
As Llysses sailed past the island of the Sirens, bound hand and foot as lie
was to the mast of his ship, truly he must have heard a tempting sueet song, for
the Sirens promised him foreknowledge of all future happenings on earth. Figura-
tively, we too have offered such a song. But, rather than lure the reader off
course, by reason and calculation we have pointed him/her in the same direction
Llysses was headed-home. The task before social work and social welfare lies at
home. It lies in making our welfare institutions into the very best they can be.
Appendix: Data Sources
Welfare Effort: To obtain data for the maximum number of years data on wel-
fare programs were taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States and
various years of Statistical Abstracts.16, 1 7 Although the data are not strictly
comparable, most of the discrepancy seems to fall into education, which along
with public housing, we are omitting from the welfare effort measure. Public
expenditures for social insurance, public aid, health and medical programs,
veterans programs, and other social welfare were totalled and divided by Gross
National Product.
iRilitary Effort: Federal Government expenditures for national defense
fumctions (Statistical Abstracts, 1962 and 1974), have been divided by Gross
National Product to provide a measure of military effort. Veterans benefits and
services are not included in this measure.
CUP: Gross National Product data have been divided by population and con-
verted to 1966 dollars to indicate CQP per capita in constant dollars. 18 These
figures are not comparable to the international model data as in that case CliP
was computed at factor cost.
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Aged. The aged variable represents the proportion of the population age 65
and older and was obtained from the Economic Report of the President, 1974, and
Historical Abstracts of the United States, 1960. The projection of proportion
aged is based on Census Bureau data.19
L1: The annual unemployment rate, an average of the monthly rates, was ci-
tained from the Economic Report of the President, 1974 and Historical Abstracts
of the United States, 1960. There have been some changes made in the definition
of unemployment, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to derive
more accurate figures. 1hile some sets of years may not be strictly comparable,
we feel that the rates are adequate approximations for our purposes.
FHF: The proportion of Frirtarv families headed by females was obtained from
Current Population Reports and Statistical Abstracts, 1955, 1962.20 11is series
is entered only for the years 19,50-73. The information on both Frimary families
and female-headed families was first collected in 1947 and we felt the most accu-
racy could Ue eLtained in using 1i5L and later census data. The rrojections of
feuale-headed families are from Census Bureau data. 2 1
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